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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WARREN IRRIGATION
COMPANY, a corporation,
Appellant,
vs.
MIL TON T. BROWN and
FLORENCE H. BROWN, his wife,
Respondents.

Case No.
12620

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
One would logically assume from the fact that
the Warren Irrigation Company (Appellant) filed the
complaint, that its water rights are in dispute. However, this is not the case. The Respondents acquired
80 acres of land and the water rights therefor by a
deed dated October 23, 1939. (Ex. 9) Respondents
receive their water through the canal system of the
appellant company, and for the next 30 years (until
1969) they received their full decreed water every year
without problem or protest, and paid the assessment
made therefor, all in accordance with the terms of a
decree between their predecessor, Lyman Skeen, and
the Appellant here.

On June 5, 1969, the board of directors of the
appellant company considered the question of limiting Respondents to no more than one-half of their decreed water right, due to the fact that part of the la!1~
owned by Respondents' predecessor had been sold.
(See the minutes of June 5, 1969 meeting, Ex. 8). The
Company did withhold delivery of one-half of the
water, and Respondents, in July of 1970, filed a petition for an order requiring Appellant to deliver water
to them in accordance with the 1914 decree. (Ex. L,
File 4677).
The predecessors in interest of the Respondents
had twice litigated these same water rights with the
Warren Irrigation Co. The first litigation resulted in the
decree, which is dated November 10, 1914. (Ex. L.
File 4677). As we shall presently demonstrate, Lyman
Skeen, who was the plaintiff in this 1914 action, and
his immediate successors in interest, Mary E. Brown
and David A. Skeen, received the water and paid the
assessments in accordance with this 1914 decree,
without any problem until 1937.
In 1937 the Warren Irrigation Co. again refused
to deliver the water, and Mary E. Brown and David A.
Skeen filed a petition in Civil No. 4677 (Ex. L) for an
order directing the Appellant to deliver the water, as
provided for in the 1914 decree. This petition also resulted in an order dated February 5, 1938, which as we
shall later note in more detail, expressly confirmed
that the petitioners were the owners of all rights decreed to Lyman Skeen in 1914, and directed the Ap-
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pellant to deliver the water in accordance with that decree. However, although the petition, which was filed
August 9, 1937, and the answer and other pleadings
were properly filed in Civil No. 4677, (Ex. L) for some
reason, the order itself, which was entered February
5, 1938, was filed in another case between the same
parties. in Civil No. 4201, and that order is the last
document in Ex. L. in the part of the file which is Civil
No. 4201.
When Respondents filed their petition for an
order to show cause in July, 1970, they gave it the
number of the civil file where the 1938 order was filed. Attached to the petition were copies of both the
1914 decree, in Civil 4677. and the order entered in
1938. on the petition filed in Civil 4677, but as noted,
the order was filed in Civil No. 4201. The order to
show cause issued. there were some discovery procedures. and the matter finally came on for trial. At
the trial. counsel for the Appellant raised for the first
time the objection that the petition and order to show
cause used Civil No. 4201 (which was the file where
the 1938 order was filed) rather than Civil No. 4677
(which is the file where the 1914 decree was entered.)
While we didn't agree that this was a problem, it could
be readily cured by refiling the petition for the order
to show cause in Civil No. 4677. and the trial did not
proceed. Before Respondents could refile their petition. the Appellant filed its complaint in this action,
and thereby attempted to collaterally attack the earlier
decrees.
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The trial court, in its Finding No. 1, correctly
noted "that the water rights of the appellant company
are not in dispute," and that the issue between the
parties involved the right of the Respondents to receive the water decreed to Lyman Skeen on November
10, 1914. (R. 82). The board of directors of the appellant company, by refusing to deliver this decreed
water to the Respondents, caused the lawsuit. The
only reason they gave in their minutes for refusing to
deliver the water was that part of the land owned by
Lyman Skeen had been sold. (Ex. 8). As we shall
presently see, this sale took place in 1922, and for 47
years thereafter the water was delivered to the Respondents and their predecessors. This litigation was
filed because of this refusal to deliver the water, and
the right of Respondents to receive this water is the
issue the parties litigated, and it is the primary
issue here.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondents' predecessor in interest, Lyman
Skeen, acquired the water right, which is now in litigation, from Utah Power & Light Company, by a deed
dated February 11, 1903. (Ex. H.) The Warren Irrigation Co., the Appellant here, succeeded to the rights
of the power company, and thereafter in 1913 failed
to deliver the water to Lyman Skeen in accordance
with the 1903 deed. He filed a complaint in the District Court of Weber County, naming the Warren Irrigation Co. as the defendant. (Ex. L, Civil 4677). This
litigation resulted in the entry of a decree, which is
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dated November 10, 1914. The water was delivered
by the Warren Irrigation Co. to Lyman Skeen and his
successors in interest, in accordance with the terms
of this decree for 55 years. The only problem the
parties ever had during this 55 year period occurred
in 1937 when the Appellant erroneously thought that
it only had to furnish water when it was available in
Four Mile Creek. (Tr. 55). When the company refused
to deliver the water, Mary E. Brown and David A.
Skeen, who were successors in interest to Lyman
Skeen, (Ex. 10) filed a petition in 1937 to compel the
delivery. They expressly alleged in paragraph 1 of
their petition that they:
". . are the successors in interest of the
plaintiff above named, Lyman Skeen, and now
are the owners of all rights given and granted
to the plaintiff Lyman Skeen by a decree of this
court, entered on or about November 10, 1914."
The Warren Irrigation Co. (the appellant here) did not
contravert that allegation, but to the contrary, in paragraph 1 of its answer, it admitted this allegation of
ownership. (Ex. L Civil 4677) Mr. East, who was the
president of the appellant company, for 36 years, said
that the dispute in 1937 was over the source of the
water. (Tr. 55). During the trial he and the attorney
for the appellant company. Mr. David Wilson, went to
the courthouse. and obtained the 1914 decree. Mr.
Wilson said:
"We just as well go back. we're beat," (Tr. 54).
They stopped the trial at that point, and Judge Wade
entered the order of February 5. 1938, which we think
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clearly found and determined that Mary E. Brown and
David A. Skeen were the successors in interest to Lyman Skeen, and
" . . . are now the owners of all rights
given and granted to the plaintiff (Lyman
Skeen) by the decree of this court entered
herein on November 10, 1914." (Ex. L. Civil
420.)
The decree ordered the delivery of the water exactly
as the 1914 decree had, to-wit, it ordered the appellant company to deliver the water to the petitioners
for 48 hours out of every fourteen days. It assessed
damages against the defendant for failure to deliver
the water. There is not one single issue which was
raised in the court below, nor which is raised here
that could not have been raised in 1937. We will discuss this in more detail below. We note here only that
the trial court in this case, in its Memorandum Decision, concluded:
"The rights and obligations between the
parties have been determined by previous decrees, which are res judicata. After living with
these decrees for nearly fifty years, plaintiff is
not in a position to raise issues which were or
could have been previously settled." (R. 81)
There really is no dispute in the evidence. The
water has been delivered to Lyman Skeen and his
successors in interest in accordance with the 1914
decree at all times, except during the Summer of 1937.
When the company refused to deliver the water in
1937, the matter was taken to court, as noted above,
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and the court ordered the delivery of the water. Mary
E. Brown, who was one of the petitioners in the 1937
litigation, was married to the rather of Respondent
Milton Brown in 1931 or 1932. (Tr. 61 ). Milton Brown
resided in their home, and worked on the farm. He
was familiar with the use of water from 1933 forward.
He received the deed to his property (Ex. 9) in October
of 1939.
No one at all denied that the water was delivered
to Lyman Skeen and his said successors in interest in
accordance with the 1914 decree, as above set forth.
Harold M. Thompson, who was an officer and director
of the appellant company. has been familiar with Milton Brown's farm for fifty years, and on cross-examination he testified, unequivocally. that for fifty years
this decreed water has been used on the farm now
owned by Milton Brown. (Tr. 21)
Elwood F. Skeen. who was called as a witness
by the Appellant. was the son of Lyman Skeen. He
was born in 1908. and at that time his father was living
on this property. (Tr. 37) He would have been about
14 years of age in 1922 (Tr 37) When he first remembers the farm of his father, Lyman Skeen, Lyman
owned about 160 acres. (Tr. 40) He remembers the
sale to his brothers. Wilford and Blaine, in 1922. (Tr.
40). He testified unequivocally on cross-examination
that after the sale of the two 40-acre tracts to Wilford
and Blaine (Ex. K) the decreed water was used on the
80 acres that Lyman had left after the sale. (Tr. 41).
He also testified that Wilford and Blaine did not use
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the decreed water. (Tr. 41). The witness said he had
worked on his father's place, and had later leased it,
and he irrigated the land which is now owned by Milton Brown, and which is shown on Ex. C. (Tr. 39). Milton Brown lived on the place since about 1933, and
from 1933 to 1937 the only water that was available
to irrigate the 80 acres now owned by Respondents
was this decreed water. (Tr. 62). See also testimony
of Morris Skeen. (Tr. 33). The Respondent, as noted
above, acquired the property in 1939, and he received
all of the decreed water for this land until 1969. (Tr.
62). A survey made for Respondents indicated that
there are 79 acres in Respondents' tract, but they
always called it 80 acres. (Tr. 66). The 1903 deed
from Utah Power & Light Company contained a limitation on the place of use. It expressly said that the
water could be used on 110 acres out of the 14 7 acre
tract, and not otherwise. (Ex. H). Exhibit C shows the
land in the Milton Brown farm, and the acreage shaded in dark blue is not within the permitted acreage
under the 1903 deed. However, this place of use limitation is not carried forward in the 1914 decree, and
the trial court expressly so found. (Finding No. 3, R.
84). Of course, this can be confirmed by examining
the 1914 decree, which is in evidence. (Ex. L, Civil
4677). The evidence does not show when or for what
reason Lyman Skeen started using water in violation
of this restriction in the 1903 deed, nor does it show
whether he did so, because of the 1914 decree. However, the uncontraverted evidence is that for at least
fifty years, which goes back to the earliest memory
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of the witnesses called, this decreed water right has
been used on the 80 acres now owned by Milton
Brown, and the witnesses all specifically stated that
the land outside the 1903 deed was being irrigated.
Harold M. Thompson. a witness for the Appellant, and
an officer and director of appellant company, said that
he could remember the use of the water on the Milton
Brown farm for at least f 1fty years. and he expressly
testified that the VJater was being used on land outside the 1903 deed. (Tr 21. 22) Appellant's witness,
Elwood F. Skeen. who was born on the Lyman Skeen
place in 1908. also expressly so test1f1ed. (Tr. 38, 39).
He also could remember back to 1922. Respondent
Milton Brown. who can remember since 1933. also
expressly so testified. (Tr 67) No one testified to the
contrary.
The trial court. in F1nd1ng 10 (R. 87) found that
since 1922 the water has been used on the 80 acres
owned by Respondents. that the water has been
assessed against the defendants and their predecessors in interest: that no complaint has ever been made
about the place of use. and that plaintiff is now barred, by its own conduct. by its !aches, and its long
acquiescence in the place of use from complaining
that some of the water is used outside the 147 acre
tract described in the 1903 deed.
Harold M. Thompson expressly admitted that for
at least fifty years. the water was so used without protest from the company, (Tr 22) and Milton Brown
testified that he never had any protest from the com9

pany. (Tr. 67). So the court disposed of the contention that only 50 acres of the Milton Brown land could
be irrigated on three bases: First, in Finding 3, R. 84,
it found that the 1914 decree does not contain any
limitations in regard to the place of use. Secondly, in
Finding No. 9, the court found that the decreed water
was being used on the 80 acres now owned by the
Respondents in 1938 when the litigation occurred
between Mary E. Brown and David Skeen, as petitioners, and the Warren Irrigation Company as Respondent, and that the appellant company could have raised
any issues relating to the place of use in the 1938 litigation, but did not do so. (R. 87). Third, it found in
Finding No. 10 that the water had been used on this
80 acres since at least 1922, without protest, and that
the Appellant is barred by its own conduct, by its
!aches, and its long acquiescence in the place of use
from now complaining that some of the water is used
outside of the 147 acre tract.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES HAVE ALREADY BEEN ADJUDICATED.
Before turning to the specific arguments of Appellant, we desire to note that this is an effort by the
Appellant to collaterally attack the two earlier decrees
entered against Appellant by the District Court for
Weber County. The first litigation occurred in 1914,
when Lyman Skeen filed his complaint in Civil No.
10

4677, alleging that Appellant was not delivering water
to him in accordance with his rights under the 1903
deed This litigation ended in a stipulated decree,
which was very specific and which the court quoted
in its findings almost in full (Finding No. 3, R. 83). It
awarded Lyman Skeen 5 cubic feet of water for 48
hours out of every 14 days during the months of April,
May and June, and 4 c.f.s. every 14 days for a period
of 48 hours during the months of July, August and
September. The water was to be supplied from Appellant's "natural sources of supply (exclusive of its
pumping plant)." It further provided that if there was
not sufficient water in the natural source of supply, the
Warren Irrigation Co. "shall be required to deliver only
such quantity as 1t may be able to divert and deliver
from its said sources of supply " It fixed the annual
payment "1n full for the water supplied and furnished
as aforesaid" at $33 per year, and it concluded by
stating that if the rights of the plaintiff under the decree
shall be terminated by the "foreclosure of any mortgage now existing on the property of the defendant,
then and in that case. the rights of the parties hereto.
as provided in those certain deeds and contracts set
out as exhibits in the answer herein, shall revive and
become in full force and effect." The two deeds which
were attached to the answer are the 1903 deed from
the power company to Lyman Skeen and the 1904
deed from Lyman Skeen and his wife to the power
company.
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There is nothing in the record to indicate any
trouble or dispute over the administration of this decree until 1937. In 1937, the Appellant refused to deliver water to Mary E. Brown and David A. Skeen, who
were the successors in interest to Lyman Skeen. (Ex.
10) Mary E. Brown and David A. Skeen filed a petition
in Civil No. 4677 on August 9, 1937. In that petition
they alleged that they were the successors in interest
of Lyman Skeen "and now are the owners of all rights
given and granted to the plaintiff Lyman Skeen by a
decree of this court entered herein on or about November 10, 1914." This allegation is admitted by the
Appellant in its answer. The petitioners alleged that
the Appellant was refusing to deliver water, and asked
for an order directing the company to deliver the water
to the petitioners, in accordance with the 1914 decree.
As is noted above, the then president of the company, A. D. East, and the company attorney, David
Wilson, after finding the 1914 decree, stopped the trial
and permitted the order of February 5, 1938 to be
entered (Ex. L. Note: The pleadings are in Civil No.
4677. The order is in Civil 4201.) This order expressly
recited that the petitioners were the successors of
Lyman Skeen, and that they "are now the owners of
all rights" awarded to Lyman Skeen in the 1914 decrees. It directed the appellant company to deliver
the water and assessed damages.
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We won't labor this point further here, but we do
desire to note that there is not one single issue raised
on this appeal or in the trial court that is not related
to things which had transpired before this 1937 litigation. The irrigation of land outside that permitted
by the 1903 deed had started sometime at or before
1922. (Tr. 21, 38). The 40-acre tracts had been sold
to Blaine and Wilford Skeen in 1922. (Ex. K). From
1922 until 1938, when the order was entered, 100 per
cent of the Skeen decreed right was delivered to Lyman and his successors in interest. (Tr. 21, 31, 33,
38-40). None of it was delivered to Blaine or Wilford.
(Tr. 31, 33, 38-40). The appellant company continued
to assess 100 per cent of the water to Lyman Skeen
and his successors. (Ex. 11, 12, 13). It did not assess
any to Blaine or Wilford. (Ex. 11, 12, 13). If this transfer to Blaine and Wilford in any way affected the right
of Lyman and his successors in interest to receive the
water, that pattern had existed for more than fifteen
years. and could have been and should have been
raised in the 1937 litigation. The 1904 deed from Lyman Skeen and his wife to the power company, which
has a reversion clause in it, had, of course, been in
existence since 1904. If it automatically cancelled the
rights of Lyman Skeen and his successors, whenever
the Appellant withheld the water, this could have been
and should have been raised as a defense in both the
1914 and the 1937 litigation. Any problems about the
source of the water to supply the decreed right could
have been raised in the 1937 litigation, which the
court will note was only concerned with the problem
of water sources.
13

The parties have lived by the 1914 decree for
more than 55 years. The Appellant has twice litigated
this right, and every issue it now raises in this action
and on this appeal could have been raised in 1937.
The defenses are all based on things which transpired
before 1937, and the trial court correctly held that
these previous decrees were res judicata.
It is elementary law that the principles of res
judicata apply not only to the issues which were raised
and litigated, but also to all issues which could have
been raised. This matter is noted in Wheadon v.
Pearson, 14 U. 2d 45, 376 P. 2d 946. There the court
quoted from its earlier decision in fast Mill Creek
Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 108 Ut. 315, 159 P. 2d 863,
as follows:
" . . . there are two kinds of cases where
the doctrine of res judicata is applied: In the
one the former action is an absolute bar to the
maintenance of the second; it usually bars the
successful party as well as the loser; it must
be between the same parties or their privies; it
applies not only to points and issues which are
actually raised and decided therein but also to
such as could have been therein adjudicated,
but it only applies where the claim, demand 0r
cause of action is the same in both cases. In
such case the courts hold that the parties
should litigate their entire claim, demand and
cause of action, and every part, issue and
ground thereof, and if one of the parties fails to
raise any point or issue or to litigate any part of
his claim, demand or cause of action and the
matter goes to final judgment, such party may
not again litigate that claim, demand or cause
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of action or any issue. point or part thereof
which he could have but failed to litigate in the
former action.
"
See also Wood v. Turner, 19 Ut. 2d 133, 427 P. 2d 397.
The foregoing is also in accordance with the general law. See 46 Am Jur. 2d, Judgments, Section 417.
The previous lawsuits. both in 1914 and 1937,
were between the Warren Irrigation Company as the
defendant and Lyman Skeen and his successors in
interest as the petitioners. The water right with which
we are concerned here is the same water right which
was the subject matter of the two previous suits. This
lawsuit. and both of the previous matters involved a
failure on the part of the Appellant to deliver the
water. In each of the two previous suits the Appellant retained an attorney and filed an answer. Many
of the arguments now being made could have been
made in 1914. This is particularly true of the claim
that the 1904 deed automatically cancelled both
deeds when the Appellant failed to deliver the water.
Also, since the assessment for the joint use of the
canal had been assessed at $33 per year. from at
least 1907. that problem also could have been raised
in 1914. Not one of the matters raised in Appellant's
brief is based on anything that happened after 1937.
We thus submit that the matter is res judicata, and
it should not be necessary to respond to these points,
all of which could have been and should have been
raised 30 to 55 years ago in previous litigation between the same parties over these same rights.
15

POINT

II

THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE TERMINATED RESPONDENTS' WATER RIGHT,
BECAUSE OF THE REVERSION CLAUSE IN
THE 1904 DEED.
There are two reasons why the reversion clause
in the 1904 deed will not operate as Appellant contends. First, this argument is barred by the two decrees already entered, and second, Appellant is misconstruing the reversion clause.
The 1904 deed was in existence when the Appellant and Lyman Skeen had their lawsuit in 1914. In
fact, the deed was attached to the answer filed by the
Appellant in that case. (Ex. L). The complaint of Lyman Skeen then is the same as the complaint of the
Respondents now - to-wit, the Appellant had cut
down the amount of water it was delivering to Lyman
Skeen. If this refusal to deliver water automatically
cancelled both the 1903 and the 1904 deeds, as A~
pellant now contends, Appellant should have raised
that as a defense in the 1914 litigation. Apparently
neither of the parties so construed the deeds. In his
amended complaint, Lyman Skeen alleged that the
parties had been making an exchange since 1896, and
in paragraph 5 he alleged that the parties had mutually agreed that the arrangement should be permanent, and that deeds would be exchanged. The Appellant admitted the exchange, admitted the execution of the deeds, and attached copies of the deeds
to its answer. It could have asserted the defense
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which the Appellant is trying to assert now, but it
didn't do so. Rather, it stipulated to a decree, and for
55 years the parties have administered the water in
accordance with that decree.
Again in 1937 the Appellant refused to deliver
water, and the successors of Lyman Skeen filed a
petition to compel them to do so. Again, this defense
that the 1904 deed wiped out both deeds and the 1914
decree could have been asserted as a defense. It
was not so asserted, and the court affirmed the right
of the petitioners in an order signed February 5, 1938,
and for the next 30 years the parties abided by that decree, without protest or problem, and the trial court
correctly held that this issue could not be raised at
this late date.
Further, we submit that Appellant is misconstruing the terms of the deed. There is, as noted above, a
deed from the power company, dated February 11,
1903, to Lyman Skeen. This was introduced as Ex. H,
and a copy is attached to the answer of the Appellant
in the 1914 suit. (Ex. L) Lyman Skeen and his wife. on
February 16, 1904, gave an exchange deed to the
power company. A copy of this deed is attached to
Appellant's answer in Civil 4677. This 1904 deed
contains the following language:
"Provided always, and the above grant,
by the party of the first part is made for the express consideration that in case the Utah Light
& Railway Company, or its grantor, the Pioneer
Electric Power Company, or any of its or their
17

assigns, or successors in interest, shall wilfully refuse to carry out the agreement to deliver
water which is contained in the deed, to the
party of the first part hereto, which deed is dated in the caption 11th of February, 1903, then
the grant of the water right in their deed shall
cease and determine, and the parties hereto
of the first part shall be restored to all the right
they had prior to the giving of this deed, and no
length of time shall vary their part of this
agreement."
We construe this provision to say that the power
company and its successors are obligated to deliver
water in accordance with the agreement which is contained in the 1903 deed, and if the power company
and its successors wilfully fail to deliver the water,
then the grant of the water right in "their deed", meaning the power companys' 1904 deed, shall cease and
determine, "and the parties hereto of the first part"
(meaning Lyman Skeen and his wife) "shall be restored to all of the right they had prior to the giving
of this deed." (The 1904 deed). It does not say that the
party of the second part will be restored to its rights.
What it does say is that Lyman Skeen and his wife
shall be restored to the rights they had before they
gave "this deed", the 1904 deed, and that the rights
of the power company under the 1904 deed shall
cease and determine.
In any event, we think this question is now moot
It is a problem which existed in 1913, when the company wilfully failed to deliver water. It could have been
and should have been raised as a defense to that suit.
18

It was also available as a defense in 1937, when the
Appellant again refused to deliver water and it could
have been and should have been raised as a defense
to that suit. But in was not. The trial court, in Finding
No. 6, expressly found that this claim and any other
claim and limitations contained in the deeds could
have been raised by the plaintiff (appellant here) in
the previous litigation, but they were not, and in 1914
the court issued an order which it says was in lieu of
the deed, and in 1937 the court entered a further order
that Respondents' predecessors owned all of the
rights decreed to Lyman. The Appellant is more than
55 years late in raising this argument.
POINT

Ill

THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S
FINDING IN REGARD TO THE 1914 DECREE.
There isn't any finding by the trial court that the
1914 decree "entirely superseded the 1903 deed",
as Appellant contends on page 14. This, in any event,
is purely a collateral matter. Appellant does not tell
us about anything that is in the 1903 deed which continues to control the rights of the parties, along with
the 1914 decree.
The finding by the trial court that the decree was
in lieu of the deed is in Finding No. 3, and the only
thing the court does there is quote the language of
the 1914 decree, which expressly says:
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"That in lieu of the provision contained in
that certain deed dated February 11, 1903," etc.
Lyman Skeen should receive certain water. Finding
No. 3 in this case concludes by noting that the limitation in the 1903 deed prohibiting the use of water outside the 14 7-acre tract was not carried forward in the
decree. (R. 83). This is a correct finding.
Appellant apparently wants this court to imply
that the trial court placed its holding in regard to the
place where the water could be used entirely on the
fact that the limitation was not carried forward from
the deed to the decree. It is clear, however, that this
is not so.
The court, after correctly noting that this limitation was not carried forward into the decree, found in
Finding No. 4 that for at least 50 years the water described in the 1914 decree has been used on the 80
acres which the Respondents now own. (R. 84). Then
in Finding No. 10 (R. 87) the court found that since at
least 1922 the decreed water had been used on Respondents' 80 acre-tract, that it had been assessed
against the Respondents and their predecessors in
interest, no complaint has ever been made about the
place of use, and that the plaintiff is now barred by its
own conduct, by its laches, and its long acquiescence
in the place of use from now complaining that some of
the water is used outside the 14 7 acre tract described
in the 1903 deed.
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The court also found in Finding No. 9 that the
water was being used outside the 147 acre tract in
1937, when Mary E. Brown and David Skeen filed their
petition against the Appellant, and the court expressly
noted that the irrigation company could have raised
any issues relating to the place of use in 1938 in that
litigation, but did not do so. Appellant has not shown
how it is damaged by the change in place of use. Appellant makes no effort to respond to the basis on
which the court placed its decision. It merely makes
the theoretic argument that the court wrongfully implied that every provision of the 1903 deed was superseded by the 1914 decree. The court made no such
finding, and entered no such conclusion, and we don't
know whether as an abstract matter the issue is genuine or moot. Certainly the finding that the limitation in
the deed on the place of use was not carried forward
into the decree is simply one detail in explanation of
the fact that at least since 1922 the Appellant company
and Lyman Skeen and his predecessors have ignored
this provision of the deed and for the holding by the
court that this is a matter that could have been and
should have been raised in 1938. The court also
found that the water right had been assessed to Respondents and their predecessors. that they have paid
the assessment and based on all of these matters, the
court held that this use outside the 147 acres described in the 1903 deed is not something the appellant
can raise now.
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--We don't know what other provisions there are
in the deed which Appellant contends have survived
the decree. Certainly the schedule for delivering the
water was expressly changed. Also, the deed provided that the water was to be furnished from the
waters of the Weber River, Mill Creek and Four Mile.
The decree provided that the water should be delivered from the company's natural sources of supply ··exclusive of its pumping plant."
The deed provided that in the event of shortage.
Skeen would have to pro-rate the use of water with
water used by others on the same system. The decree
provided that in case there is not sufficient water in
the natural sources of supply exclusive of the pumping
plant the company need only deliver the quantity
which is available.
Both the decree and the deed provide for the
payment of $33 per year for the use of the water. The
language is different. The deed provides for payment
of 30 cents per acre for each acre of water to which
Lyman Skeen is entitled, and the decree converts this
to $33 per year "in full for the water supplied and furnished." The first paragraph of the decree states, as
quoted above, that "in lieu of the provisions contained" in the deed, water should be delivered according
to the decree, and the last paragraph suggests that
the deed was fully superseded. Apparently the irrigation company had mortgages on its canal system
and water rights. If the mortgages were foreclosed, it
would, of course, supersede the decree. The last
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paragraph said that if these mortgages of the Appellant were foreclosed, thus terminating the decree,
''. : . then and in that case, the rights of
the parties hereto as provided in those certain
deeds and contracts set out as exhibits in the
answer herein shall revive and become in full
force and effect."
Thus, though the trial court made no finding that
the decree totally superseded the deed, as Appellant
asserts that it did, and although we don't know of any
issue between the parties that makes this of any importance, it clearly would appear that the decree superseded the deed, because it is inconsistent with it in
several particulars, including the schedule for the delivery of water, the source of water supply, administration in times of shortage, etc., as set forth above,
and then the decree does use the words "in lieu of"
in the first paragraph, and in the last paragraph talks
of the deed being "revived," and "becoming in full
force and effect" if the decree is terminated by the
foreclosure of the mortgages. The decision of the
court in regard to place of use and the rationale it
used is correct. We don't believe that there is any
other issue in this regard.
POINT

IV

THE FINDINGS AND DECREE AS ENTERED
ARE CORRECT.

Under its Point 3, Appellant raises five separate
points. We now answer each of them.
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The first point raised is whether Respondents are
obligated to pay their share of the expenses of operating and maintaining the Appellant's canal system
The trial court dealt with this matter in its Finding No.
8, where it found that the decree of November 10,
1914, fixed the basis for annual assessments at 30
cents per acre, or $33 per year, that the assessments
have been made on this basis for more than 58 years,
that the $33 assessment was provided for in the original deed of 1903, and was carried forward into the
decree, that this was the basis for the assessment in
1938, when further litigation was bad, and that the
assessment against the water should be $33 per annum. Certainly, this finding is supported by the uncontraverted evidence. The deed (Ex. H) does provide for an assessment of 30 cents per acre for the
110 acres. The 1914 decree expressly provides that
Lyman Skeen should pay each year "the sum of $33
in full for the water supplied and furnished as aforesaid." It goes on to say that the company doesn't have
to deliver the water, unless the annual assessment is
paid.
Exhibits 11, 12 and 13, which are xerox copies
of the pages from the Appellant's books, show that
since 1907 this is the way the parties have construed
the deed and later the decree for the assessment
throughout all of that time, and until the present dispute arose, has been on this basis. See also testimony of the Secretary of Appellant (Tr. 32). In 1922,
Lyman Skeen apparently acquired two shares of
stock, and the assessment made to him that year
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--shown in Ex. 13, is $33 for the Skeen water and $3.50
for the stock. In 1923 they are combined at $37, and
they are combined in isolated years thereafter, but in
1924, 1925 and 1926 they are separated.
In Ex. 12, covering the period of 1929-1950, the
top of the ledger shows: "Skeen Right 110 - 30 cents
per share." During many of the years the $33 appears
as a separate item. Ex. 11, covering 1951-1969, on
the top of the sheet again appears "110 shares at 30
cents per share" and the water is separately assessed.
So the deed provides for the $33. This is carried forward in different language in the decree. We have
the books of the Appellant company since 1907, and
they show that the parties themselves have so construed first the deed, and then the decree. and that
the assessment since 1907 has been $33 per year.
Part of the canal assessment is obviously for water
rights and facilities acquired after the decree. See
Tr. 27, where the witness is testifying about two pumps
purchased for $4,400 and $4,800, and in 1945, and
1946, the construction of a dam in 1962 for $56,527,
and reference is made to the purchase of water in the
Echo Reservoir on page 28. See also testimony of
Secretary of Appellant Tr. 31-33. The 1914 decree expressly gives Lyman Skeen no interest in the pumping
plant. It says that the water is to be furnished from the
natural sources of supply for the canal system "exclusive of its pumping plant" and as we stipulated on
page 28, no claim is made to any water rights acquired
after 1914. There is no rational basis for having Respondents pay the same price per share as do the
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stockholders in the company, who have water mas~ers, corporate officers and corporate expense, pumping plants and after-acquired water rights and facilities
in which we have no interest. (Tr. 33). The parties
themselves, for more than 62 years, have placed this
construction on the 1903 deed and the 1914 decree,
and the court correctly held that this is the correct
assessment.
The next point raised by Appellant is the right of
the defendants to irrigate land other than land from the
14 7 acres described in the 1903 deed. We have fully
discussed this problem on page 20 of our brief, and
will not repeat the arguments here.
As a part of Point B, however. the Appellant in
one short paragraph discusses the alleged transfer of
part of this water to Blaine and Wilford. (See page 22
of Appellant's brief). It was this alleged transfer which
was the reason given by the company in its minutes
on June 5, 1969 (Ex. 8) for refusing to deliver the
water decreed to the Respondents. It was a major
issue in the trial court. but is disposed of by a one
sentence comment in the argument. We think we
ought to give the court the details on it, and now do so
Lyman Skeen had 160 acres of land in 1922 (Tr.
40). That year he sold 40 acres of the land to his son
Blaine and 40 acres to his son Wilford. (Ex. K). The
contention of the Appellant is that water was appurtenant to this 80 acres. and that under Section 73-1-11.
U.C.A. 1953. the water passed with the land The 1903
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deed (Ex. H) fixed the place of use as being 11 o acres
out of a specifically described tract containing 147.37
acres. The deed does not describe the particular 11 o
acres to be irrigated. The statute on which Appellant
relies expressly states that:
. "If a right has been exercised in irrigating
different parcels of land at different times the
right shall pass to the grantee of any parc el of
land on which the right was exercised next preceding" the conveyance.
1

Appellant did not show which part of Lyman's 160
acres were being irrigated in 1922 with the Skeen
Right. Lyman Skeen's son, Elwood, was asked (Tr.
40) if he knew how the water was used before 1922,
and he answered that he did not. So there is no showing that the water was appurtenant (used on) the two
tracts sold to Wilford and Blaine.
It is, however, not contraverted that after the
transfer to Wilford and Blaine, Lyman kept 80 acres,
and that from 1922 until the date of this trial, the water
in question was used on this land. We have discussed
this above, and refer the court to the testimony of Harold M. Thompson, (Tr. 21, 22) and Elwood Skeen (Tr.
39-41), Milton Brown. (Tr. 61, 62) and Morris Skeen
Tr. 33. During all of the time between 1922 and 1939,
a water right could be acquired by seven years of continues, open and adverse use. See Wellsville Irrigation
Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 Ut. 448, 137
P. 2d 634. The uncontraverted evidence is that Ly-
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man Skeen and his successors used the water on the
remaining 80-acre tract, and the trial court so found.
(Finding No. 5, R. 84).
Next, it is clear that neither Wilford nor Blaine
claimed the water. The same year they acquired the
land they gave a mortgage and they described their
water rights as 25 shares in the Warren Irrigation Company (Ex. 4 and 5). It is equally clear that Lyman
claimed it. Ex. 3 shows that Lyman Skeen pledged
this water to the State of Utah. The pledge is noted on
the Appellant's books. (Ex 3). The uncontraverted
testimony is also to the effect that Blaine and Wilford
never received any of the water (Tr. 33, 41, 21, 61-62,
46). Finally, this transaction took place in 1922. The
Appellant had a law suit with Respondents' predecessors in interest, Mary E. Brown and David Skeen,
in 1937. They filed a petition to compel the Appellant
to deliver water to them in accordance with the 1914
decree. They expressly alleged in their petition that
they were the owners of "all the rights" decreed to
Lyman Skeen in 1914. The Warren Irrigation Company
filed an answer in that suit, and it admitted this allegation. The litigation ended in an order dated February 5, 1938, confirming that the petitioners "are now
the owners of all rights given and granted" to Lyman
Skeen in 1914. If the transfer to Blaine and Wilford
Skeen in 1922 was a legitimate issue, certainly it
should have been raised as a defense to the 1937
petition. Not only did Appellant fail to raise the issue,
it went beyond that and admitted in its pleadings, that
Mary E. Brown and David Skeen were the owners "of
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all rights" decreed to Lyman, and the trial court in
1938 so ordered, and for 30 years thereafter Appellant
has delivered the water to Respondents. Certainly,
the trial court was correct when it found in its Memorandum Decision that none of the water went to Wilford
or Blaine; that they never claimed it; and that the Appellant is not in a position to claim it for them, and in
its further notation that the parties have lived with the
1914 decree, which was strengthened by the 1938 decree, and the rights and obligations of the parties are
res judicata. The court also found in detail the facts
as recited above in regard to Wilford and Blaine in its
finding No. 5. (R. 84 ).
The contention made under Point C is that the
court should have made some finding or decree about
relative priorities. This was not an issue, and it isn't
one now. The issue was whether or not Respondents
owned 100 per cent of the 1914 decreed right, and
the court held that they did. It didn't modify that decree as to source, or in any other way. It simply settled
that issue. The findings were served on the attorney
for Appellant on the 8th day of July, 1971. The decree
was not prepared at that time, and was not sent to the
plaintiff's attorney until the 15th of July. They were
then sent on to the court and entered on July 18th.
During this period of time counsel made no objection
to the form of the findings or to their failure to deal with
additional issues, and no motions were made before
the appeal was filed. The trial court committed no
error in this regard.
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The next point, which is raised on page 22 of
Appellant's brief, is a fictitious claim that the water
cannot be beneficially used. This argument ignores
the holding of the court that for 50 years the 80 acre
tract now owned by Milton Brown has been irrigated
by this water, and for all the reasons noted above, the
Appellant can't question the place of use now. The
engineer called by the Appellant testified that in general, land in this area needs 3 acre feet of water per
acre per year. (Tr. 10). On 80 acres this would require
240 acre feet. Appellant's expert also testified that if
water were delivered strictly in accordance with the
amounts required by the 1914 decree, Respondents
would receive 252 acre feet during the irrigation season. (Tr. 9). This is only 12 feet more than the expert
indicated would be needed under a three acre foot
duty. On cross-examination he was asked if he had
tried to make a precise determination for this particular 80-acre tract, and he said that he had not. He was
asked if he might be in error as much as 10 or 15 per
cent, and he said "Yes". (Tr. 11 ). Milton Brown, who
has irrigated this tract since 1933, and makes his living
as a farmer (Tr. 61, 62) testified that he needs all of the
water for the 80 acre tract which he owns. (Tr. 63).
Elwood Skeen, who was born on the ranch, had irrigated it, and finally leased it, was asked about the
need for the water. {Tr. 38). He said that sometimes
they had to skip some lucerne or something like that,
to move it around to make enough water for the land
until the grain matured, and then the Skeen right provided enough water. So again we assert that there is
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no conflict in the evidence The testimony of Respondent that he needed all of the water on the 80
acres is consistent with the testimony of the engineer
of three acre feet (plus or minus 10-15%) is needed.
The court made an express finding on this matter.
(Finding 9, R. 87). It found that the water has been
used on this 80 acre tract since 1922, and that "the
entire 252 acre feet of water produced by said right
can be and has been beneficially usec on said 80
acres."
The final point on page 24 1s also not an issue.
We do not claim, the court did not rLle, and there was
no issue about water rights acquired after 1914. The
1914 decree gives us the right to receive a specified
amount of water from the Appellant's natural sources
of supply, exclusive of its pumping plant. All the trial
court did here in that regard was to hold that Respondents own 100 per cent of that decreed right
It is respectfully submitted that the Judgment
should be affirmed.
CL YOE, MECHAM & PRATI
EDWARD W. CL YOE
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys tor Respondents
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